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Facebook and the Future of Fair Housing Online
Introduction
Facebook, the behemoth social media company founded in 2004, is no
stranger to criticism in pursuit of its mission “to give people the power to
build community and bring the world closer together.” 1 Facebook’s critics
have variously attacked its stance on privacy, 2 retention of member
information, 3 and its role in proliferating false news, 4 among a host of
other issues. 5 Amidst the hail of allegations against Facebook, the claim
that Facebook’s advertising platform violates the Fair Housing Act has
some powerful backers in the Department of Housing and Urban
Development and the Justice Department. 6 This Note focuses on the
National Fair Housing Alliance’s (NFHA) suit against Facebook as an
exemplar for understanding the current state of law governing housing
discrimination online. Although Facebook and the NFHA ultimately
reached a settlement agreement, 7 the facts alleged in NFHA’s suit reify
the larger issue of how to effectively and pragmatically effectuate
potentially conflicting legislative goals (specifically the goals of the Fair
Housing Act (FHA) and the Communications Decency Act (CDA)). 8
1. FAQs: What Is Facebook’s Mission Statement?, FACEBOOK: INVESTOR REL.,
https://investor.fb.com/resources/default.aspx (last visited Dec. 10, 2019).
2. Geoff Duncan, Open Letter Urges Facebook to Strengthen Privacy, DIGITAL
TRENDS (June 17, 2010, 9:28 AM PST), https://www.digitaltrends.com/computing/openletter-urges-facebook-to-strengthen-privacy/.
3. Maria Aspan, How Sticky Is Membership on Facebook? Just Try Breaking Free,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/11/technology/11facebook.
html.
4. Hillary Clinton Says Facebook ‘Must Prevent Fake News from Creating a New
Reality’, TELEGRAPH (June 1, 2017, 4:21 AM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/
2017/05/31/hillary-clinton-says-facebook-must-prevent-fake-news-creating/.
5. Alyssa Newcomb, A Timeline of Facebook’s Privacy Issues—and Its Responses,
NBC NEWS (Mar. 24, 2018, 6:02 AM CDT), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/social-media/
timeline-facebook-s-privacy-issues-its-responses-n859651.
6. Brakkton Booker, HUD Hits Facebook for Allowing Housing Discrimination, NPR
(Aug. 19, 2018, 7:42 AM ET), https://www.npr.org/2018/08/19/640002304/hud-hitsfacebook-for-allowing-housing-discrimination (citing a HUD complaint against Facebook
and the Justice Department’s filing of a statement of interest in the National Fair Housing
Alliance’s suit against Facebook).
7. Facebook Settlement: Civil Rights Advocates Settle Lawsuit with Facebook:
Transforms Facebook’s Platform Impacting Millions of Users, NAT’L FAIR HOUSING
ALLIANCE, https://nationalfairhousing.org/facebook-settlement/ (last visited Dec. 10, 2019).
8. Even though Facebook and the NFHA have settled their dispute, the issues
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This Note will analyze the questions presented in the NFHA case
against Facebook in three parts. Part I analyzes the apparent statutory
conflict between the provisions of the FHA and the CDA and the policy
goals driving both enactments. Part II discusses CDA immunity in other
contexts and the only two circuit court cases that specifically address the
tension between the CDA and the FHA. Both cases are instructive as
starting points for adjudicating housing discrimination claims in the
digital context, though neither entails the level of sophistication alleged in
NFHA’s complaint. Finally, Part III applies existing case law to the
NFHA complaint and argues that reinvigorating the good faith language
of the CDA and using modern tools to ensure compliance with the FHA
will create a legal climate in which the purposes of both statutes may be
better fulfilled.
I. The Building Blocks of Online Housing Discrimination
A. The Fair Housing Act
The Fair Housing Act, enacted in 1968, aimed to “replace America’s
segregated residential landscape with ‘truly integrated and balanced living
patterns.’”9 The FHA bares its teeth in § 3604, which prohibits the
following: discriminatory rejections of potential buyers or renters; 10
discrimination in terms or conditions of renting and provision of services
to buyers or renters; 11 discrimination in housing advertisements based on
discussed in this Note are still pressing for several reasons. First, Facebook has previously
made hollow proclamations that it would stop discriminatory housing ads. Julia Angwin,
Ariana Tobin & Madeleine Varner, Facebook (Still) Letting Housing Advertisers Exclude
Users by Race, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 21, 2017, 1:23 PM EST), https://www.propublica.org/
article/facebook-advertising-discrimination-housing-race-sex-national-origin. Second, HUD
charged Facebook with discrimination in violation of the Fair Housing Act which is
unimpacted by the settlement agreement between the NFHA and Facebook. Charge of
Discrimination, HUD v. Facebook, Inc., FHEO No. 01-18-0323-8 (HUD Mar. 28, 2019),
https://www.hud.gov/sites/dfiles/Main/documents/HUD_v_Facebook.pdf.
Finally,
and
perhaps most importantly, there is a distinct financial incentive to use targeted advertising,
which means that issues involving discriminatory targeted advertising are unlikely to
dissipate. See HOWARD BEALES, NETWORK ADVERT. INITIATIVE, THE VALUE OF BEHAVIORAL
TARGETING 1 (2010), https://www.networkadvertising.org/pdfs/Beales_NAI_Study.pdf.
9. Rigel C. Oliveri, Discriminatory Housing Advertisements On-Line: Lessons from
Craigslist, 43 IND. L. REV. 1125, 1129 (2010) (quoting 114 CONG. REC. 3422 (1968)
(statement of Sen. Mondale)).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2012).
11. Id. § 3604(b).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol72/iss3/6

2020]

NOTES

713

protected characteristics; 12 and false representations that a property is not
for rent or sale when such representation is made based on a protected
characteristic of the prospective renter or buyer. 13 Section 3604(c) is the
basis of the complaint against Facebook, as it makes it unlawful
[t]o make, print, or publish, or cause to be made, printed or
published any notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect
to the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference,
limitation, or discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex,
handicap, familial status, or national origin, or an intention to
make any such preference, limitation, or discrimination. 14
Subsequently, courts broadly applied this provision to traditional forms of
print media.15
In United States v. Hunter, the Fourth Circuit became the first appellate
court to consider § 3604(c) and the potential liability not only for those
creating discriminatory advertisements but also for publishers of
discriminatory advertisements. 16 The court rejected the claim that an ad
for a “white home” was beyond the FHA’s reach and instead held that
“discriminatory classified advertisements in newspapers was precisely
one of the evils the Act was designed to correct.”17
Courts have also interpreted the breadth of § 3604(c)’s prohibition
expansively in the context of traditional print media.18 In Ragin v. New
York Times Co., the Second Circuit considered whether the district court
properly denied the New York Times’ motion to dismiss a complaint
alleging that the Times’ “real estate advertisements ‘featur[ed] thousands
of human models of whom virtually none were black,’ and that the few
blacks depicted rarely represented potential home buyers or renters,”
under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 19 In affirming the denial,
the Second Circuit held that § 3604(c) is “violated if an ad for housing
suggests to an ordinary reader that a particular race is preferred or
12. Id. § 3604(c).
13. Id. § 3604(d).
14. Id. § 3604(c).
15. See Ragin v. N.Y. Times Co., 923 F.2d 995, 999–1000 (2d Cir. 1991); United States
v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 210 (4th Cir. 1972).
16. See Hunter, 459 F.2d at 209.
17. Id. at 209, 211.
18. See Ragin, 923 F.2d at 999–1000.
19. Id. at 998 (quoting the complaint).
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dispreferred for the housing in question.”20 The court rejected the
“intolerably narrow” reading of the statute the Times proffered, which
would have limited the prohibition to “the most provocative and offensive
expressions of racism or . . . outright refusal to sell or rent to persons of a
particular race.”21 Instead, the court looked at the “broad language” in §
3604(c) to hold that “the word ‘preference’ . . . describe[s] any ad that
would discourage an ordinary reader of a particular race from answering
it.”22 This expansive interpretation of § 3604(c)’s prohibition and the
accompanying potential for liability largely led to the disappearance of
discriminatory housing advertising in traditional media after the early
1970s.23
B. The Communications Decency Act
In 1995, the New York Supreme Court issued a decision 24 that, in part,
sparked Congress’s urgency in passing the Communications Decency
Act. 25 A securities investment banking firm alleged that Prodigy Services,
a computer network provider that hosted the “Money Talk” bulletin
board, which was “allegedly the leading and most widely read financial
computer bulletin board in the United States,” was liable as a publisher
for libelous statements made by third-party posters. 26 Because Prodigy
issued statements about how it sought to control the content on its bulletin
boards, provided guidelines for permissible content, and ran automatic
screening software, the court concluded that Prodigy was “a publisher
rather than a distributor.” 27 In essence, the court applied the model of
20. Id. at 999.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 999–1000.
23. Oliveri, supra note 9, at 1143 (“Thus, after the early 1970s discriminatory housing
ads largely vanished.”) (citing 17 AM. JUR. 2D Civil Rights § 394 (2010)).
24. See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., Index No. 031063/94, 23 Media
L. Rep. (BNA) 1794 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995), 1995 WL 323710.
25. Julie Hsia, Note, Twitter Trouble: The Communications Decency Act in Inaction,
2017 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 399, 408. (noting that Stratton Oakmont and Cubby, Inc. v.
CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), together brought about the urgency to
create the Act).
26. Stratton Oakmont, 23 Media L. Rep. at 1795, 1995 WL 323710, at *1.
27. Id. at 1797, 1995 WL 323710, at *4. “[O]ne who repeats or otherwise republishes a
libel is subject to liability as if he had originally published it. In contrast, distributors . . .
may be liable for defamatory statements of others only if they knew or had reason to know
of the defamatory statement at issue.” Id. at 1796, 1995 WL 323710, at *3 (citations
omitted).
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liability used in the traditional media context to an internet bulletin and
held that “PRODIGY’s conscious choice, to gain the benefits of editorial
control, has opened it up to a greater liability than . . . other computer
networks that make no such choice.” 28
The decision in Stratton Oakmont29 immediately stirred resistance in
Congress because it created a perverse incentive for website operators to
exercise less editorial control to avoid publisher liability for third-party
content. 30 In 1996, Congress passed the Communications Decency Act,
which aimed to “promote the continued development of the Internet
and . . . preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently
exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered
by Federal or State regulation.”31 The Act had the dual purpose of
overruling the decision in Stratton Oakmont and enlisting internet service
providers (ISPs) in the battle against what Congress perceived to be
obscene material proliferating on the nascent internet. 32 Ultimately, a
federal district court enjoined most of the Act one week after its
enactment 33—a decision subsequently affirmed by the Supreme Court in
Reno v. ACLU.34
Section 230(c) of the Communications Decency Act survived the
Supreme Court’s decision in Reno unscathed and has since become a
cornerstone for website operator immunity in a variety of contexts. 35 The
28. Id. at 1798, 1995 WL 323710, at *5.
29. Martin Scorsese brought the story of this firm and its demise to life in the 2013 film
The Wolf of Wall Street. See Eriq Gardner, Paramount Defeats ‘Wolf of Wall Street’ Libel
Suit from Stratton Oakmont Alum, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Dec. 13, 2018, 1:55 PM PT),
https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/paramount-defeats-wolf-wall-street-libel-suitstratton-oakmont-alum-1169108.
30. See Matthew Schruers, Note, The History and Economics of ISP Liability for Third
Party Content, 88 VA. L. REV. 205, 212–13 (2002).
31. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1)–(2) (2018).
32. Schruers, supra note 30, at 213; see also Scope, Exclusions and Legislative Purpose,
4 E-COMMERCE AND INTERNET LAW 37.05[1][A] (2019 update), ECOMMINTLAW
37.05[1][A] (Westlaw) (“Subpart 230(c)(1) was intended to overrule the Stratton Oakmont
decision.”).
33. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 883 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
34. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997) (“[T]wo statutory provisions enacted to
protect minors from ‘indecent’ and ‘patently offensive’ communications on the Internet . . .
[unconstitutionally] abridge[] ‘the freedom of speech’ protected by the First Amendment.”)
(footnote omitted).
35. See, e.g., Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding social
network immune from state negligence claim); Green v. Am. Online (AOL), 318 F.3d 465,
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immunity provided under § 230(c) is twofold. First, § 230(c)(1) prohibits
any “provider or user of an interactive computer service” from being
“treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by
another information content provider.” 36 Next, § 230(c)(2) essentially
creates a “Good Samaritan” portion of the immunity provision by
exempting “provider[s] or user[s] of an interactive computer service”
from liability for “action[s] voluntarily taken in good faith” to limit or
remove obscene material. 37
The statute also defines two terms that have become critical in the
jurisprudence surrounding CDA immunity: “interactive computer service
[provider]” and “information content provider.”38 The CDA defines
interactive computer service providers as any “information service,
system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer
access by multiple users to a computer server.” 39 By contrast, the CDA
defines information content providers as any “person or entity that is
responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of
information provided through the Internet or any other interactive
computer service.”40 Scholars have noted that the first portion of § 230
seems to entail a robust immunity when read alone, but when read in
context, the statutory immunity is more limited in its scope. 41
In a decision interpreting § 230 just over one year after its enactment,
the Fourth Circuit held that it granted “broad immunity” to service
providers. 42 The question of how this broad immunity interacted with the
468 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding AOL immune from state tort law claim); Ben Ezra, Weinstein,
& Co. v. Am. Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 984 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding defendant immune
from state law claims for defamation and negligence).
36. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2018).
37. Id. § 230(c)(2)(A).
38. Id. § 230(f)(2), (3).
39. Id. § 230(f)(2).
40. Id. § 230(f)(3).
41. See Oliveri, supra note 9, at 1140.
42. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997). Here an unknown
person posted messages to an AOL bulletin board on April 25 and 26, 1995, advertising
shirts mocking the Oklahoma City bombing (which occurred on April 19, 1995) and listed
the plaintiff’s phone number urging users to call. Id. at 329. As a result of these posts and a
subsequent Oklahoma City radio station broadcast about the posts, the plaintiff received a
deluge of angry calls and death threats. Id. In upholding AOL’s immunity under the CDA,
the court recognized the important interests of ensuring open communications on the internet
and encouraging website operators to self-police without the threat of publisher liability
hanging over their heads. Id. at 331. Accordingly, the court held that “Congress’ desire to
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Fair Housing Act was left unanswered for over a decade, until the Seventh
and Ninth Circuit Courts first addressed the potential conflict.
II. Craigslist & Roommates – Two Circuits Consider the Conflict
A. Craigslist: FHA Liability for Purely Third-Party Content
Although some scholars noted the potential conflict between the FHA’s
advertising provisions and § 230’s immunity, 43 the issue was not
considered at the circuit level until a pair of decisions by the Seventh and
Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals in 2008. 44 In Chicago Lawyers’
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., a public
interest consortium alleged that Craigslist violated § 3604(c) of the FHA
by permitting notices on its site that included statements such as “NO
MINORITIES” and “No children.” 45 Although the court expressed general
support for the notion that “§ 230(c)(1) provides ‘broad immunity from
liability for unlawful third-party content,’”46 it rejected the notion that §
230(c) could “be understood as a general prohibition of civil liability for
web-site operators and other online content hosts[.]”47
Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary
judgment for Craigslist because the site could only be liable as a publisher
under § 3604(c) of the FHA and § 230(c)(1) states that “an online
information system must not ‘be treated as the publisher or speaker of any
information provided by’ someone else.”48 The court reasoned that §
promote unfettered speech on the Internet must supersede conflicting common law causes of
action.” Id. at 334.
43. Jennifer C. Chang, Note, In Search of Fair Housing in Cyberspace: The
Implications of the Communications Decency Act for Fair Housing on the Internet, 55 STAN.
L. REV. 969, 1011 (2002) (“This complete legislative silence [on the FHA/CDA conflict]
suggests not only that [Congress] failed to realize that fair housing interests would be
implicated at all in the passage of § 230, but that Congress did not intend for the fair
advertising mandates to be abrogated.”).
44. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d
1157 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc); Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v.
Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2008).
45. Chi. Lawyers’ Comm., 519 F.3d at 668.
46. Id. at 669 (citing Zeran, 129 F.3d at 327; Ben Ezra, Weinstein & Co. v. Am. Online,
Inc., 206 F.3d 980 (10th Cir. 2000); Green v. Am. Online (AOL), 318 F.3d 465 (3d Cir.
2003); Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003); Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v.
Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413 (1st Cir. 2007)).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 671 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1)).
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230(c)(1)’s prohibition on liability need not mention the FHA because “a
law’s scope often differs from its genesis.” 49 The impetus for §
230(c)(1)’s immunity was the Stratton Oakmont decision, in which the
court held “an information content provider liable, as a publisher, because
it had exercised some selectivity with respect to the sexually oriented
material it would host for customers.” 50 Even so, the issue for the court
was not the particular impetus that led Congress to enact the CDA, but
rather the language of the statute itself which “covers ads for housing, . . .
and everything else that third parties may post on a web site.” 51 Further,
the court noted that “[n]othing in the service craigslist offers induces
anyone to post any particular listing or express a preference for
discrimination.”52 The court concluded that the plaintiffs could pursue a
claim against the third-party creators of the discriminatory
advertisements, but they could not “sue the messenger just because the
message reveals a third party’s plan to engage in unlawful
discrimination.”53
B. Roommates.com: Creating Discrimination Online
The Ninth Circuit addressed the same statutory tension in Fair Housing
Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC. 54 The
defendant, Roommates.com, LLC (“Roommate”), 55 operated a website
that matched prospective roommates. 56 Roommate required users to create
profiles before using the website 57 and also required that they disclose
their sex, sexual orientation, and whether the user would be moving in
with children. 58 Roommate also offered an optional “Additional
49. Id.
50. Id.; see also Oliveri, supra note 9 at 1139–40 (“The ruling in Prodigy troubled
lawmakers, who wanted to facilitate the free flow of ideas on the Internet but also wished to
encourage website operators to screen and filter offensive content, particularly pornographic
or indecent material. Thus, a provision entitled ‘“good Samaritan” blocking and screening of
offensive material’ was added to the CDA[.]”) (footnote omitted).
51. Chi. Lawyers’ Comm., 519 F.3d at 671.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 672.
54. 521 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
55. Id. at 1161 n.2 (“For unknown reasons, the company goes by the singular name
‘Roommate.com, LLC’ but pluralizes its website’s URL, www.roommates.com.”).
56. Id. at 1161.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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Comments” section, which encouraged users to describe themselves and
what they were looking for in a prospective roommate. 59 The Fair
Housing Councils of the San Fernando Valley and San Diego
(“Councils”) filed suit, alleging that Roommate violated the Fair Housing
Act by requiring disclosure of protected characteristics, using this
information to develop profile pages for each user, and therefore
perpetuating discrimination. 60 Further, the Councils “argue[d] that
Roommate should be held liable for the discriminatory statements
displayed in the ‘Additional Comments’ section of the profile pages.” 61
A majority of the en banc Ninth Circuit held that, under the CDA,
Roommate was not immune from liability for requiring disclosure of
protected characteristics and publishing profiles based on those
characteristics, but it was immune from liability for discriminatory
statements in the “Additional Comments” section. 62 In holding that
Roommate was not immune as to user profile registration and information
disclosure, the court focused on the fine line between being a purely
“interactive computer service provider” as opposed to an “information
content provider.”63 The court interpreted CDA immunity as applying
only to interactive computer service providers insofar as they are not
“‘responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of’ the
offending content.”64 Since a website can both “passively display[]
content that is created entirely by third parties,” as well as create content
itself, “a website may be immune from liability for some of the content it
displays to the public but be subject to liability for other content.” 65
Addressing the required questionnaire, the court viewed Roommate as
“undoubtedly the ‘information content provider’” and held that it could
not “claim . . . immunity for posting [the questions] on its website, or for
forcing subscribers to answer them as a condition of using its services.” 66
While the court left the issue of whether the questions violated the FHA
or warranted First Amendment protection for remand, the court roundly
rejected the notion that the questions existing online entitled Roommate to
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id.
Id. at 1164–65.
Id. at 1173.
Id. at 1164, 1172, 1174–75.
Id. at 1162.
Id. (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3)).
Id. at 1162–63 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 1164.
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immunity under the CDA. 67 The court reasoned that “asking questions
certainly can violate the Fair Housing Act . . . in the physical world . . .
[and such questions] don’t magically become lawful when asked
electronically online.”68 Thus, Roommate was not immune under the CDA
because it “induc[ed] third parties to express illegal preferences.” 69
The second issue—Roommate’s use of user responses to build user
profiles and match prospective roommates—keyed on the notion of what
it means for an interactive computer service to create or develop the
information in whole or in part. 70 While the majority recognized that
reading the term “develop” too “broadly would defeat the purposes of
section 230 by swallowing up every bit of the immunity that the section
otherwise provides,” it also rejected the notion that an information content
provider must be the exclusive developer of discriminatory content in
order to remove CDA immunity. 71 With this tension between under- and
over-inclusivity in mind, the court interpreted the term “development” as
“referring not merely to augmenting the content generally, but to
materially contributing to its alleged unlawfulness.” 72 In light of this
definition, the court viewed Roommate’s role in the development of the
allegedly unlawful content as “direct and palpable.” 73 Since Roommate
designed its website “to force subscribers to divulge protected
characteristics . . . and to match . . . based on criteria that appear to be

67. Id.
68. Id. (footnote omitted).
69. Id. at 1165.
70. Id. at 1162 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3)).
71. Id. at 1167.
72. Id. at 1167–68.
73. Id. at 1169. The court summarized Roommate’s role in actively developing
discriminatory content as follows:
Roommate designed its search and email systems to limit the listings available
to subscribers based on sex, sexual orientation and presence of children.
Roommate selected the criteria used to hide listings, and Councils allege that
the act of hiding certain listings is itself unlawful under the Fair Housing Act,
which prohibits brokers from steering clients in accordance with discriminatory
preferences. We need not decide the merits of Councils’ claim to hold that
Roommate is sufficiently involved with the design and operation of the search
and email systems—which are engineered to limit access to housing on the
basis of the protected characteristics elicited by the registration process—so as
to forfeit any immunity to which it was otherwise entitled under section 230.
Id. at 1169–70 (footnotes omitted)).
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prohibited by the FHA,” the court held that it could not enjoy immunity
under § 230. 74
The court further emphasized the difference between those activities
that enjoy CDA immunity and those that do not by holding that
Roommate enjoyed immunity for the “Additional Comments” section. 75
Effectively, Roommate provided “a blank text box, in which [users could]
type as much or as little” as they pleased. 76 The court reasoned that such
blank entry forms are “precisely the kind of situation for which section
230 was designed to provide immunity,” because such content “comes
entirely from subscribers and is passively displayed by Roommate.” 77
Unlike the questionnaire and profile matching issues, Roommate’s
“Additional Comments” section “does not tell subscribers what kind of
information they should or must include.” 78 Ultimately, the court
concluded that Congress did not pass § 230
to prevent the enforcement of all laws online; rather, it sought
to encourage interactive computer services that provide users
neutral tools to post content online to police that content
without fear that through their ‘good samaritan . . . screening of
offensive material,’ they would become liable for every single
message posted by third parties on their website. 79
The decisions in Craigslist and Roommates.com elucidate a few critical
ideas courts have used in resolving the potential conflict between the FHA
and CDA. First, websites enjoy a presumption of immunity for third-party
content, and purely neutral tools (open text boxes or blank-entry search
engines, for example) will generally enjoy immunity under the CDA as
the statute relates to the FHA. Second, to overcome this presumption of
immunity, plaintiffs must show that the website operator participates in
creating or developing the content at issue—as the Ninth Circuit defines
it, “materially contributing to its alleged unlawfulness.” 80 Finally, if a
website operator takes steps to induce or require users to disclose
protected characteristics and subsequently operationalizes that
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 1172, 1175.
Id. at 1174.
Id. at 1173.
Id. at 1174.
Id.
Id. at 1175 (citation omitted).
Id. at 1168.
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information, the website operator may thereby become a content provider
and forfeit its immunity.
III. Facebook and the Future of Fair Housing Online
The preceding analysis of the Fair Housing Act, the Communications
Decency Act, and the case law interpreting the conflict between the two,
exposes two critical issues in the NFHA complaint against Facebook. The
first, and perhaps more basic, issue is whether Facebook’s “Pre-Populated
List[,]” which allegedly allows “landlords and real estate agents [to] target
certain persons or groups for, and exclude other persons or groups from,
receiving housing ads,” constitutes a sufficient act of creation or
development so as to overcome Facebook’s immunity under the CDA. 81
The second, and more difficult, issue is whether Facebook participated in
the development of discriminatory housing advertisements and vitiated its
immunity by “extract[ing] data from its users’ online behavior . . . and
us[ing] algorithms designed to sort that data, process it, and repackage it
to group potential customers into . . . categories for advertisers to choose
from when targeting their ads.”82
Essentially, the latter issue concerns whether Facebook is immune
when it allows advertisers to exclude certain users based on their interest
in proxy categories such as “Telemundo” or “Interest in Disabled Parking
Permit.”83 More generally, this issue will only grow as digital
advertisement continues to grow in importance, as evidenced by digital
advertising “account[ing] for half of total US advertising sales for the first
time [in 2018].”84
A. Facebook’s Reply and Issues of Law
In its reply to the NFHA complaint about discriminatory housing
advertisements, Facebook argues that its activities are distinct from those
of the defendant in Roommates.com in that Roommate offered “an online
housing service used by only housing advertisers, whereas Facebook
offers a generic online advertising service used by all advertisers placing
81. First Amended Complaint at 34, Nat’l Fair Hous. All. et al. v. Facebook, Inc., No.
1:18-cv-02689-JGK (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
82. Id. at 13.
83. Id. at 34.
84. Press Release, MAGNA, MAGNA Advertising Forecasts (Fall Update – Executive
Summary) at 3 (Sept. 20, 2018), https://magnaglobal.com/magna-advertising-forecasts-fallupdate-executive-summary.
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ads for all types of products, services and information.”85 This initial
distinction as to the nature of the websites seems dubious at best. In the
context of traditional media, courts would not treat a newspaper
publishing a discriminatory housing ad among ads for “all types of
products, services and information” differently from a publication
dedicated exclusively to publishing housing advertisements. 86
Ultimately, Facebook argues that “there is nothing unlawful under the
FHA . . . about Facebook requiring users to identify their sex at signup or
using that information to create tools that allow, but do not require, all
advertisers to target ads for all types of products, services and
information.”87 As to the “‘pre-populated list’ of targeting options,”
Facebook flatly denies that discriminatory options are readily available. 88
Instead, Facebook argues that these tools are only an “option” accessed
“through searches using a blank search box or by browsing multi-level
menus.”89 With the required disclosures at sign-up and use of the
information disclosed, Facebook argues that “there is no publication of a
discriminatory housing ad on Facebook unless an advertiser decides to (1)
create a housing ad and (2) target it in a discriminatory manner.” 90 Such a
system “is the definition of a ‘neutral tool’ under the CDA and
establishes, under well-settled precedent, that Facebook is not an
‘information content provider’ in this case.” 91
As to this second line of argument, it is likely that Facebook is correct
under current precedent. To dispel the dissent’s concerns about the
holding in Roommates.com, the majority opinion provided some examples
of activity that would “not amount to ‘development’ under section 230.” 92
The court’s list of examples included “ordinary search engine[s used] to
query for a ‘white roommate,’ . . . [or] a housing website that allows users
to specify whether they will or will not receive emails by means of user85. Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Transfer Venue, or
Alternatively to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint at 9, Nat‘l Fair Hous. All. v.
Facebook, Inc., No. 1:18-cv-02689-JGK (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
86. See Ragin v. N.Y. Times Co., 923 F.2d 995, 999–1000 (2d Cir. 1991).
87. Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Transfer Venue, or
Alternatively to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint, supra note 85, at 11.
88. Id.
89. Id. (citation omitted).
90. Id.
91. Id. (citing Herrick v. Grindr, LLC, 306 F. Supp. 3d 579, 589–90 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)).
92. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d
1157, 1169 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
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defined criteria.”93 If Facebook’s factual allegations are true, then it is
likely immune under current jurisprudence because it does nothing to
require or encourage discriminatory housing advertisements. In
Roommates.com, it was critical to the court’s decision that the website
operator required disclosure and then matched users based on this
disclosure. By contrast, nothing Facebook has done could be viewed as
requiring discrimination as a functional part of its platform.
Discriminatory housing advertisements within its system are
discriminatory only insofar as a third-party chooses to make them so.
Under the current legal framework, it is likely Facebook would succeed
though this question is still open since the parties have reached a
settlement agreement. 94
B. Looking Beyond the Facebook Complaint
Although Facebook and the NFHA have settled their dispute, the
complaint exposes some of the limitations of the current framework for
analyzing the conflict between the Fair Housing Act and the
Communications Decency Act and provides an opportunity for reflection
on potential improvements. This Note offers two suggestions to address
the shortcomings of the statute. The first suggestion is backward-looking.
Although the provisions of § 230 have been interpreted generally as
providing “broad immunity from liability for unlawful third-party
content,” such an interpretation ignores the context within which the CDA
was enacted and the text of the statute itself. 95 The second suggestion is
forward-looking. If Facebook’s, or any other website’s, advertising
algorithms are truly functioning as a “neutral tool,” how are agencies
tasked with enforcement of applicable federal regulations (or other
interested parties) to know? Recent scholarship has underscored the
93. Id.; see also Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist,
Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 671–72 (7th Cir. 2008) (“Nothing in the service craigslist offers induces
anyone to post any particular listing or express a preference for discrimination . . . . If
craigslist ‘causes’ the discriminatory notices, then so do phone companies and courier
services (and, for that matter, the firms that make the computers and software that owners
use to post their notices online), yet no one could think that Microsoft and Dell are liable for
‘causing’ discriminatory advertisements.”).
94. See supra note 7.
95. Chi. Lawyers’ Comm., 519 F.3d at 669–70 (citing Zeran, 129 F.3d at 327; Ben Ezra,
Weinstein & Co. v. Am. Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980 (10th Cir. 2000); Green v. Am. Online
(AOL), 318 F.3d 465 (3d Cir. 2003); Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003);
Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413 (1st Cir. 2007)).
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importance of understanding “technical accountability [as] a necessary
step to enable political accountability.” 96 These two avenues are in no way
fool-proof or complete solutions to the issue of fair housing online;
however, they represent realistic means through which the goal of ending
discriminatory housing advertisements may be effectuated, with due
respect for the past and appropriate acknowledgment of the future.
The first avenue to resolving the conflict between the CDA and the
FHA is to recognize, as the Seventh Circuit has, that “§ 230(c) as a whole
cannot be understood as a general prohibition of civil liability for web-site
operators.”97 The court understood that if § 230 immunity is divorced
from its origins and title (“Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’ blocking and
screening of offensive material”),98 then the logical conclusion is that
websites lack motivation to monitor the material they host. 99 Instead, the
immunity afforded under § 230(c) must be understood according to its
language that requires “action[s] voluntarily taken in good faith.”100 As
the Seventh Circuit persuasively argued in Craigslist, immunity from civil
liability under the CDA is earned, not granted regardless of whether the
website operator takes action. 101 To effectively pursue the goals of the
Fair Housing Act online, courts should require good faith actions by

96. Deven R. Desai & Joshua A. Kroll, Trust but Verify: A Guide to Algorithms and the
Law, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 11 (2017).
97. Chi. Lawyers’ Comm., 519 F.3d at 669.
98. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2018).
99. Chi. Lawyers’ Comm., 519 F.3d at 669–70 (“If this reading is sound, then § 230(c)
as a whole makes ISPs indifferent to the content of information they host or transmit:
whether they do (subsection (c)(2)) or do not (subsection (c)(1)) take precautions, there is no
liability under either state or federal law. As precautions are costly, . . . ISPs may be
expected to take the do-nothing option and enjoy immunity under § 230(c)(1). Yet §
230(c)—which is, recall, part of the ‘Communications Decency Act’—bears the title
‘Protection for “Good Samaritan” blocking and screening of offensive material’, hardly an
apt description if its principal effect is to induce ISPs to do nothing about the distribution of
indecent and offensive materials via their services.”) (quoting Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d
655, 660 (7th Cir. 2003)).
100. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A).
101. Chi. Lawyers’ Comm., 519 F.3d at 669–70 (“Section 230(c)(2) tackles this problem
[of potential liability for hosting pornographic pictures] not with a sword but with a safety
net. A web host that does filter out offensive material is not liable to the censored customer.
Removing the risk of civil liability may induce web hosts and other informational
intermediaries to take more care to protect the privacy and sensibilities of third parties.”)
(quoting Doe, 347 F.3d at 659) (alterations in original).
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entities like Facebook when their tools are used to perpetuate
discrimination.
Policing discriminatory housing advertisements purely by pursuing
claims against individual users is largely ineffective. 102 The most
straightforward and efficacious avenue is to “simply add[] the FHA to the
list of exemptions already contained in the CDA.” 103 While this would
certainly be an effective modification, such an amendment is arguably
unnecessary if courts follow the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of §
230(c). In the present case, both the NFHA and Facebook could make
effective arguments about whether Facebook has adequately operated as a
Good Samaritan trying to screen discriminatory housing advertisements.
In NFHA’s favor, it certainly seems contradictory that Facebook made
public statements about addressing the issue while ProPublica’s reporting
demonstrated that such statements do not reflect the reality of what users
can do with the targeted advertising platform. 104 However, Facebook
could likely overcome such an argument by pointing to the neutral nature
of the tools it provides and the repeated warnings it provides to
advertisers about violating the FHA and similar laws. 105
The above analysis addresses many of the legal issues presented by
NFHA’s suit against Facebook; however, the case against Facebook
reveals an instance of the larger issue of effectively regulating behavior in
a digital world with laws designed in a non-digital world. Ragin involved
adjudicating whether a single advertisement violated the FHA. 106 Stratton
Oakmont, which partially prompted Congress to adopt the CDA, involved
a website that was essentially a series of web-based bulletin boards with
around two million users. 107 Facebook, by contrast, boasts over two

102. Oliveri, supra note 9, at 1173.
103. Id. at 1174; see also Brent Skorup & Jennifer Huddleston, The Erosion of Publisher
Liability in American Law, Section 230, and the Future of Online Curation, 72 OKLA. L.
REV. 627, 653 (2020) (addressing the factors legislators must consider when imposing
liability on online intermediaries for user-generated content).
104. See supra note 7.
105. See Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Transfer Venue, or
Alternatively to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint, supra note 85, at 9–10.
106. See supra notes 18–22 and accompanying text.
107. See supra notes 24–28 and accompanying text.
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billion users and includes everything from group pages to messaging,
advertising, personal profiles, business pages, and more. 108
The second avenue of effectively implementing the FHA and the CDA
in an online world involves addressing a fundamental disconnect between
legal and technical accountability. 109 In the world of law, there is a deeply
rooted notion that the builder of object X, which performs function Y,
will know precisely what X will do and that another person with proper
instructions could similarly determine what object X will do. 110 Within the
digital context, one might argue that if Facebook were forced to reveal the
code (in lieu of plans) behind its targeted advertising system, one could
readily determine whether Facebook contributes to online housing
discrimination in any meaningful way. However, such an argument fails
to recognize the unique nature of dynamic online systems in which the
plethora of potential system interactions makes it so that “social science
auditing methods can only test ‘a small subset of those potential
inputs.’”111
While the idea of “looking under the hood” of Facebook’s advertising
platform is enticing, it would likely prove fruitless. 112 Instead, two
effective technical solutions would help bridge the gap between legal and
technical accountability: a system of input filtration 113 and an effective
system of ex-post analysis. 114 Input filtration would require that website
operators use filtering software to halt the publication of potentially
discriminatory housing advertisements briefly. 115 Website operators could
accomplish this filtering by showing the user a warning regarding the ad’s
potentially discriminatory nature and submitting the advertisement for
individualized review if the user chooses not to remove the language or
adjust the targeting. 116 This system would also support the website
108. Meira Gebel, In 15 Years Facebook Has Amassed 2.3 Billion Users—More Than
Followers of Christianity, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 4, 2019, 12:29 PM), https://www.business
insider.com/facebook-has-2-billion-plus-users-after-15-years-2019-2.
109. Desai & Kroll, supra note 96, at 7–8.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 10.
112. Id. at 34 (“[I]f the goal or dream is to test, for example, an online ad network, and
see whether a specific outcome—like race or gender discrimination—will occur, there is no
analysis that will always determine that.”).
113. Oliveri, supra note 9, at 1175.
114. Desai & Kroll, supra note 96, at 39.
115. Oliveri, supra note 9, at 1176.
116. Id.
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operator’s Good Samaritan immunity argument under the CDA because it
would allow the operator to emphasize its removal efforts, the kind of
actions Congress sought to protect in response to Stratton Oakmont.
Ex-post analysis of software systems is a subject beyond the scope of
this Note, but there are “technical tools including cryptographic
commitments and zero-knowledge proofs to allow for an automated
decision process to be used and at the same time ‘provide
accountability.’”117 In essence, these are tools that allow observers to
review whether a system performed according to its design. Given the
limitless number of possible inputs inherent in dynamic online systems
like Facebook, it is simply impossible to know every potential outcome
before the systems are in operation or what exact process produced a
given output. 118 Consequently, the best approach in such systems is to
design them with appropriate filtration systems, as discussed above, and
use effective methods to verify that the system is functioning as instructed
on the back end. While neither technical suggestion is without its faults,
both represent meaningful steps towards effectuating the legislative goals
underlying both the FHA and the CDA.
IV. Conclusion
Even though the NFHA complaint against Facebook has been settled,
the parties’ filings bring two legitimate, competing societal interests into
117. Desai & Kroll, supra note 96, at 40 (footnotes omitted). “[A] cryptographic
commitment ‘is the digital equivalent of a sealed document held by a third party or in a safe
place.’” Id. at 40 n.203 (quoting Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA.
L. REV. 633, 655 (2016)).
A zero-knowledge proof works as part of a cryptographic commitment. It
“allows a decisionmaker . . . to prove that the decision policy that was actually
used (or the particular decision reached in a certain case) has a certain property,
but without having to reveal either how that property is known or what the
decision policy actually is.”
Id. at 40 n.204 (internal citations omitted) (alteration in original) (quoting Joshua A. Kroll et
al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 668 (2016)).
118. Id. at 37 (“There are two common settings in which one tests software: white-box
and black-box. In white-box settings, the analyst has access to the source code. . . . Blackbox settings, in which the analyst is restricted to only see the inputs and outputs of the
system but not its internal operation, pose more problems. Some limitations apply in both
settings. In either setting, there are two categories of analysis: static analysis, which
examines the program’s structure or code without actually running it; and dynamic analysis,
which runs the program and observes its behavior on certain inputs.”).
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sharp focus. On the one hand, an open and free internet has allowed for
incredible economic growth—one of the principal purposes behind the
Communications Decency Act. On the other hand, the Fair Housing Act’s
purpose of ensuring equal access to housing is no less important today
than it was in 1968. Accordingly, courts and legislatures should pursue an
approach that balances these competing interests.
The approach advocated herein—that website operators claiming CDA
immunity should be required to show good faith regulatory efforts that are
technically accountable119—appropriately balances these two goals. In the
interest of fair housing, this approach prohibits website operators from
merely providing “neutral” tools and claiming CDA immunity whenever a
claim arises without reference to any standard. Instead, website operators
would be required to show good faith efforts and verify those efforts. The
goal of truly fair housing online will be most effectively pursued through
jurisprudence that upholds the intent of the Fair Housing Act by
appropriately applying the immunity afforded under the Communications
Decency Act and implementing reasonable technical requirements to
ensure dynamic online systems are functioning desirably.
Jacob Parker Black

119. Meaning specifically, online dynamic systems generating reliable evidence to verify
the system functions in the desired way.
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